Debate in the House of Lords on Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

The 6th review conference of the Biological Weapons Convention will be held late in 2006. This is the five-yearly conference meant to review the operation of the BWC. There will be a preparatory committee in Geneva from 24-28 April 2006.

Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

13 Mar 2006 – 2.52 pm

Lord Archer of Sandwell asked Her Majesty’s Government:

Whether they will put forward proposals at the review conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in November 2006.

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Lord Triesman): My Lords, the Government’s objective at the review conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention will be to strengthen further the convention. Later this month, we expect the EU to adopt formally a common position for the conference that will set out the EU’s aims, including its plans to submit specific, practical and feasible proposals to the states parties of the convention for their consideration. The Government are also considering whether to submit further proposals nationally.

Lord Archer of Sandwell: My Lords, I thank my noble friend—and not just conventionally—for that encouraging Answer. Since the Council of the EU has already adopted the joint action plan, which envisages the provision of financial resources to universalise the convention and supports its implementation by member states, is not this the moment to propose the establishment, at long last, of a secretariat to promote exactly those objectives, together with the scientific advisory committee that the Royal Society has recommended?

Lord Triesman: My Lords, my noble and learned friend will know that the Government are fully committed to strengthening the convention. We are well aware that there is considerable support for the establishment of a scientific advisory panel and a secretariat among some states parties. These are interesting ideas, and we are very ready to discuss them, possibly as part of the follow-on work programme. The UK does not oppose a formal secretariat; our priority at the review conference will be to support proposals that are feasible and add value to the effective implementation of the convention.

Lord Garden: My Lords, after the last review conference four years ago, the Government produced a Green Paper on the biological weapons convention with a list of useful proposals for the way ahead. How have they been developed in the past four years, and, in particular, will the Government press their idea for a new convention on the physical protection of dangerous pathogens?

Lord Triesman: My Lords, we have carried the arguments forward with a number of the states parties; we did so with particular energy during our presidency of the EU. We have discussed verification arrangements, security assurances and standards for safeguarding materials. I believe that we have made a valuable contribution in raising the issues in general and beginning to move towards more specific outcomes.

Lord Hannay of Chiswick: My Lords, does the Minister agree that two key issues for the review conference will be, first, how far to verify by inspection that the commitments of all signatories to the convention are being honoured and, secondly, how to prepare all countries, in particular developing countries, to cope with a biological incident? Are those two areas likely to be covered by British and EU proposals?

Lord Triesman: My Lords, both those issues are of considerable importance. The United Kingdom and the EU remain ready to support a new verification mechanism as well as new advisory mechanisms. At the moment there are no signs that the international climate has changed enough to permit universal agreement on verification, particularly given the need for the review conference to operate by consensus. We intend that it should be effective. For those reasons it would have to be universally adopted. We would not support the adoption of a verification mechanism that states could opt out of. We still have a good deal of work to do to encourage everybody to opt in.

Baroness Whitaker: My Lords, technology has advanced quite a lot since the convention was ratified. Does my noble friend feel that reviewing it every five years is adequate? Could he consider tabling proposals for the states parties to review it more frequently?

Lord Triesman: My Lords, there may be an argument for that, although the preparatory work for such conferences takes considerable time. Year by year, we have tried to introduce, through discussion papers in the various secretariat and reviewing mechanisms, ideas about verification and the safeguarding of materials that carry the argument forward. We hope on this occasion that we will also be able to carry forward in an additional paper some work on the responsibilities of scientists. That involves work that is done year by year rather than every five years. I think that, incrementally, that is probably the way we are going to get the job done.

Baroness Park of Monmouth: My Lords, can the Minister tell us whether Russia has fulfilled her commitment to destroy or make safe her biological weapons stock?

Lord Triesman: My Lords, I am not in a position to say what the Russian Federation has done in the destruction of any materials. The federation is of course a co-depository to the convention and, therefore, in our view, has—like us and the United States—special responsibilities. It has continued to make clear its commitment to the convention and has been fully involved and engaged in the intercessional programme that I have just described; we expect it to be fully involved in the review conference. I think that it does not declare the whole of its hand on all occasions in these matters, although we will press it to do so.

Lord Campbell of Alloway: My Lords, if verification is conceded as the kernel of this position, should not negotiations on verification precede all other negotiations? Otherwise, the whole thing becomes nonsense.

Lord Triesman: My Lords, I hope that that is not the case because the reality is that a number of countries are not prepared to proceed as rapidly as we would all wish on verification. I would rather that that were not true, but it is. However, I think that we can move forward in other areas and use our best endeavours to get the verification arguments going in a climate that is generally improving as some of the other issues, which have appeared to be intractable, are in fact being solved. Negotiation can often be a matter of catching a tide as circumstances become more favourable.