Biological Weapons : Who has Biological Weapons?

Despite the signing of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), it is very difficult to get independent verification on who has biological weapons. Certainly the United States believes that about 17 countries still possess them. They include Russia, Israel, Egypt, China, Iran, Libya, Syria and North Korea. According to the Arms Control Reporter , the position of governments in 2003 was as follows:

China, according to the United States, began a BW program before 1984 and probably maintains an offensive BW capability. In general, China supports weaker compliance mechanisms and stronger provisions for technology sharing. China adopted new BWC-related export controls in 2002.

Egypt, according to the United States, made BW before 1972, did not definitely eliminate its BW thereafter, and most likely continues to retain some BW capability.

France is a member of the Biological Weapons Convention and has admitted to previously having a BW programme which has now been discontinued.

Iran "probably produced BW agents" and has "apparently weaponized a small quantity of those agents," according to the United States. Reports surfaced in 1997 and 2002 that China had sold Iran dual-use equipment that could aid Iraq’s BW efforts. In December 1998, Iran reportedly attempted to hire ex-Soviet scientists to develop BW.

Iraq admitted it had conducted BW research but claimed it did not have a production program; UNSCOM inspectors found no evidence of a program. In 1993, UNSCOM declared that Iraq provided "full, final, and complete disclosure" (FFCD) of its research activities. Earlier, Iraq was alleged to possess tularemia and anthrax and the capability to deliver them. Iraq later revealed its past development of a full-scale BW program, including attempted weaponisation.

In 1996, UNSCOM believed Iraq still had 6–16 missiles with BW warheads. In 1997 and 1998, concerns over Iraq’s BW program grew. After rejecting Iraq’s declarations as inadequate and incomplete, late in 1998, UNSCOM declared itself unable to close the BW file because of Iraq’s failure to cooperate. In 1999, UNSCOM concluded that innumerable details on Iraq’s BW program remained unknown. In a comprehensive report, it outlined multiple areas that needed extensive clarification. The declaration Iraq submitted to UNMOVIC in December 2002 under Security Council Resolution 1441 contained no new information on its BW programs.

Israel has neither signed nor ratified the Biological Weapons Convention and is widely suspected of possessing BW

Libya On 19 December 2003, Libya announced the unilateral renunciation of its WMD programmes and its intention to join the relevant international treaties. Libya was already a state party to the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention. It is reported that US and UK officials have visited potential dual-use BW facilities in Libya without finding evidence of a BW programme, however, without international verification this remains uncorroborated.

North Korea "began to emphasize an offensive BW program during the early 1960s...and probably has the ability to produce limited quantities of traditional infectious BW agents or toxins" according to the United States (Jane’s Intelligence Review March 1999}. In 1993, Russian Intelligence concluded that North Korea was "performing applied military-biological research at a whole series of universities, medical institutes, and specialized research establishments. Work is being performed there with pathogens for malignant anthrax, cholera, bubonic plague, and smallpox. Biological weapons are being tested on island territories" {Jane’s Intelligence Review March 1999}.

Pakistan "has the resources and capabilities appropriate to conducting R&D relating to BW," according to a 1996 report by the US Department of Defense {Jane’s Intelligence Review March 1999}. In 1993, Russia concluded, "in Pakistan research is being conducted in the area of the chemistry of toxic and especially dangerous substances and microbiology. All the subject matter related to chemical and biological weapons is classified" {Jane’s Intelligence Review March 1999}.

South Korea was covertly developing a BW arsenal, according to North Korea.

Taiwan , according to the United States, "has been upgrading its biotechnology capabilities" but is probably not in violation of the BWC.

The United Kingdom built BW bombs in World War II and conducted secret BW research between 1964 and 1977. The United Kingdom has supported strong and relatively intrusive verification measures. In 2002, the UK proposed new ideas for strengthening the BWC. The UK is a member of the Biological Weapons Convention and has admitted to previously having a BW programme which has now been discontinued.

The United Stateshad no biological weapons according to the Arms Control & Disarmament Agency (ACDA) Treaty List of 1982: it had destroyed them by 26 December 1975. Since that time, however, the United States has conducted BW research. Recent US activities have focused on developing counter-BW detection equipment.

In September 2001, the New York Times published an article indicating that the US government had been working on clandestine programs to develop biological weapon agents and dispensers for the purpose of studying defenses since at least 1997.

In 1999, the US Congress mandated comprehensive trial inspections of US pharmaceutical and biotech industries, which were sceptical that proprietary information could be protected under a new BWC protocol. Some US officials still believed that the dual-use nature of biological agents would make a rigorous inspection regime unworkable.

On US advice, based on US intelligence estimates of other countries’ BW capabilities, the UN World Health Organisation decided in June 1999 not to destroy the only remaining stocks of the smallpox virus. In 2002, President Bush ordered the resumption of limited vaccinations against small pox.

Russia admitted that its BW programme continued into 1992 and said that it ended in 1993. Reports of continuing BW research persisted, however, as did concerns about Russian lack of openness. There were reports in 1998 and 1999 that Russia continued to develop new biological agents and maintained a production facility. In 1999, the former deputy director of the main Soviet agency for BW development and weaponisation revealed in detail a sharp increase in BW activity under Gorbachev in the 1980s, including BW-tipped ICBMs and development of a new class of weapons called bio-regulators.

Other countries . Some 27 states parties took part in at least one of the 1987–1989 rounds of the data exchange, and ten participated in all three rounds. Nearly 20 countries have been alleged by one source or another to have BW programs. In 1996,€DA said "roughly a dozen countries" might have BW programs.

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