Chemical Weapons : Who has Chemical Weapons?

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It is notoriously difficult to say which countries still possess chemical weapons. However, it's likely that many of those who have signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) have not yet destroyed all stocks. According to the Arms Control Reporter, the position of some governments in 2003 was as follows:

Albania In March 2003, Albania informed the OPCW of the discovery of a small stockpile of CW on its territory. These weapons are now under strict OPCW supervision and will soon be destroyed with assistance from Switzerland.

Egypt urged Arab states not to sign the CWC until Israel signs the NPT. Egypt is not a member of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

India Although India denied possession of CW for many years, upon the entry into force of the CWC in 1997, India declared possession of a CW stockpile and production facilities. These weapons and facilities were put under strict international supervision by the OPCW and are now in the process of being destroyed.

Iran developed CW during the end of the Iran-Iraq War, which ended with a cease-fire in 1988. Iran claims it eliminated its CW stockpile after the war but evidence of a continuing program continued to surface. In 1999, Iran informed the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) it could be added to a list of countries previously possessing CW. The CIA has said that Iran continues to seek CW-related technologies, equipment, and precursor agents.

Israel has signed but not ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention. It is widely suspected of possessing a CW stockpile.

Japan abandoned hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions of shells containing toxic chemicals in China during World War II. Under the CWC, Japan must dispose of these CW by 2007. Japan may have trouble meeting this deadline, however. Construction of a Japanese-financed chemical destruction facility, agreed in a May 1999 8-point bilateral memorandum with China, was delayed in part due to varying estimates for numbers of munitions left behind. Japan estimated that the underground facilities contained 700,000 munitions, while China put the number at around two million.

Libya On 19 December 2003, Libya announced the unilateral renunciation of its WMD programmes and its intention to join the relevant international treaties. It acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention on 6 January 2004 and declared the posession of a CW stockpile and production facilities. This declaration was subsequently verified by the OPCW and destruction of the munitions has already begun and Libya has requested permission from the OPCW to convert the production facilities to peaceful purposes. Libya's CW stockpile is now under strict international supervision and will be destroyed in accordance with the CWC.

North Korea has 2500-5000 tons of CW, mainly mustard gas, phosgene, Sarin, and VX agents, according to South Korea. North Korea is not a member of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Russia ratified the CWC on 5 November 1997 after extensive debate and a good deal of international pressure. It was having trouble acquiring the funding needed to destroy all of its chemical weapons by the convention¡¦s 2008 deadline. In 1998, the CIA reported that some factions of the Russian government wished to circumvent the CWC. In late 1999, Russian officials and scientists publicly disclosed the full scope of Russia's CW infrastructure and plans for conversion or destruction, in part due to the increasing need to secure foreign funding for these programs.

In 2000, the OPCW granted Russia an extension of the first deadline for the destruction of one percent of its CW stockpiles. The US Congress helped increase CTR (cooperative threat reduction) funding for the Shchuchye destruction plant pending certification that Russia was providing matching contributions toward the cost of the plant. In October the Duma formed a commission on CW destruction. In 2001, Russia adopted a new CW destruction plan under which it would complete destruction of its stockpiles by 2012. In 2002, the Seventh Session of the Conference of States Parties granted Russia extensions of two of the CWC¡¦s intermediate deadlines.

Serbia-Montenegro On 20 March 2000, Serbia and Montenegro acceded to the CWC and declared a former CW programme including a production facility in what is now Bosnia-Hercegovina. This facility has been put under strict international supervision by the OPCW and has been largely dismantled.

South Africa's former CBW program was probed by a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In 1998, the commission released its final report noting that the CBW program "produced little of value or common good.... At best, the programme succeeded in producing for manufacturing analogues of CR or BZ incapacitants, and in making local arrangements for protective clothing for troops against mass chemical and biological attack."

South Korea When the CWC entered into force in 1997, one country declared the possession of CW and production facilities but exercised its right not be publicly identified by the OPCW. However, it is widely known that this country is South Korea. These weapons and facilities were put under strict international supervision by the OPCW and are now in the process of being destroyed.

A Sudanese factory suspected of producing CW was attacked in August 1998 by the United States. Whether the factory actually produced CW remained unclear, although the CIA holds that the country had possessed the capability to produce CW for many years.

Syria reportedly has a stockpile of Sarin and may be trying to develop more toxic nerve agents, but remained dependent on foreign sources for key elements of its CW program, according to the CIA. In November 1999, US intelligence agencies detected an apparent military test of CW bombs by Syria. Syria is not a member of the Chemical Weapons Convention.

The United States ratified the CWC on 26 April 1997. After the United States had been in technical non-compliance with the treaty for over a year, Congress passed implementing legislation in October 1998. The legislation included restrictions on the convention's implementation that seriously undermined the convention and created a bad example for other countries.

The United States may have stored or tested CW in Panama, although its declaration, submitted on 27 May 1997, did not record such action. Panama submitted information about abandoned CW on its territory in its declaration to the OPCW. In August 1999, Panama called on the United States to clean up CW munitions buried on former military test sites. If such munitions exist, the United States would be in violation of the CWC.
Under a 1984 domestic law the United States must destroy its CW stockpile by 2004 and would spend $33 million to do so. In 1998, a study conducted by the US Army harshly criticized the Army¡¦s chemical destruction program. In July 1999, the Defense Comptroller issued another critical audit. Due in part to increasing environmental lawsuits and concerns by local citizens¡¦ groups, the Army was forced to consider alternative technologies for CW disposal as a replacement for current incineration facilities. This led to substantial delays in site construction. In 2000, the GAO faulted the slow pace of US stockpile destruction. In 2001, the DOD approved a new schedule for stockpile destruction, extending the deadlines for completion of the destruction by 2¡V4 years. The cost of the program would also increase substantially.

In 2002, the United States met its deadline for destroying 20 percent of its declared CW stocks.

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