Nuclear Weapons : Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
Geneva 28th April – 2nd May 2008
All the documents that were made publically available can be seen on the Reaching Critical Will website as well as a daily critique of the proceedings in ‘News in Review’.
Rebecca Johnson has produced and circulated a comprehensive daily analysis and an in depth first week round up of the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) and which is also available on the Acronym website
Both of these above cover the excellent statements from the NGO community presented to the PrepCom. The written papers are available on the Reaching Critical Will website.
These are my own reflections of the first week in more general terms.
This PrepCom had a very positive atmosphere to it right from the opening remarks, when the High Representative at the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, Sergio Duarte, set the constructive frame for the PrepCom in addressing his opening remarks to the representatives of states parties and to those of us from ‘---civil society who care so deeply about the future of this treaty and who are doing what they can to promote its full implementation.’
His remarks that the 2010 Review Conference would be a ‘watershed event’ for the treaty, and that disarmament was back in the public agenda, were echoed by many speakers in their opening statements. Many delegates, Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) and Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) alike, remarked on the positive and negative steps that had taken place since 2005 but almost all spoke of the need for further steps and for a common purpose in laying the groundwork at this PrepCom for a successful 2010 Review Conference.
The word ‘Trust’ came up a great many times and there appeared to be a commitment to keep the PrepCom focussed and not to be diverted even when there were the occasional direct accusations of non-compliance with either Article VI or IV and ‘Right of Reply’ was exercised. This was, I feel, in part due to a great deal of preparatory work by the chair, Ambassador Volodymyr Yelchenko of Ukraine, in securing agreements in advance of the PrepCom.
I would not want to detract from the achievements of the some of the P5 in reducing warhead numbers, nor from the very constructive future action plans of France or the UK, however at times it did feel as if we were in parallel universes. The gulf between the perceptions of the NWS of their record on implementation of Article VI and the perceptions of this by the NNWS was remarkable. In the last review cycle there was some amount of competition between the NWS for the ‘best disarmer’ award but at this PrepCom it reached new heady levels. The UK, US and France all produced leaflets highlighting their commitment to the treaty and to nuclear disarmament. The US one focussed on their ‘Article VI Accomplishments’ while France concentrated on President Sarkozy’s action plan, to which he is calling the NWS to commit by 2010. See page 10 of: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/prepcom08/statements/FranceApril28.pdf
The UK took each of the three pillars in turn and identified both their achievements and current initiatives to move forward on the processes of disarmament, non-proliferation and securing a nuclear fuel cycle that is proliferation resistant. For a taste of this see: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/prepcom08/statements/Cluster1/April30UK.pdf
When we moved into Cluster One debate it was remarkable that the NWS spoke one after another, each one trying to outdo the others in their commitment to moving the world closer toward ‘Zero Nuclear Weapons’. Many of the NNWS and all the P5 states, except China, appeared to consider that achieving reductions in nuclear arsenals was a collective responsibility and one that needed commitment from, and cooperation between, all states. In the words of Norway,’---achieving a world free of nuclear weapons must be a joint enterprise among states – nuclear weapons states and non- nuclear weapons states alike.’
China’s said that all NWS ‘should undertake unequivocally to destroy their nuclear weapons completely and thoroughly, refrain form developing new types of nuclear weapons, and reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their national security policies’. Great so far - but then went on to say that the US and Russia should take the lead, ‘They should faithfully drastically reduce their nuclear arsenals ------- so as to create necessary conditions for other nuclear-weapon states to join (emphasis added) the nuclear disarmament process.’
Norway introduced a suggestion put forward from the Oslo Conference that there should be a ‘broadly-based high-level Intergovernmental panel on Nuclear Disarmament, analogous to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, to advise governments on the core requirements for abolishing nuclear weapons.’ For the full recommendations of the Oslo conference see: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/prepcom08/statements/29AprilNorway.pdf
Iran was the most outspoken critic of the NWS repeatedly naming the UK, US and France but noticeably not Russia or China. However many other nations spoke of ‘double standards’ and although welcoming the reductions in warheads achieved they expressed concern for the continued reliance on nuclear weapons in strategic security policies of NWS. New Zealand, for example, called for no modernisation of nuclear forces nor the creation of new missions for them. New Zealand went on to say, ‘The consistent attempt to treat nuclear weapons as a unique security enhancer perpetuates the mistaken perception that nuclear weapons are an essential component of a modern military force, and provides greater prominence and status to these weapons at a time when the international community repeatedly discourages their presence and calls for their total elimination.’
Many nations welcomed the US-Russia Strategic Framework Declaration issued in Sochi by Presidents Putin and Bush and their commitment develop, as Russia described it, ‘a legally-binding arrangement following the expiration of the START Treaty as a next step to implement the obligations of the two countries under Article VI of the NPT.’. The two nations were urged to further reduce stockpiles transparently and irreversibly.
Russia held a fascinating lunch time seminar on how they envisage making the regime of the INF treaty global. The speakers presented the basic element of the treaty that has support from the US also.
One issue of major concern to a great many NNWS was Negative Security Assurances (NSAs). The UK recognised the desire of NNWS to receive multilateral guarantees from the NWS that they would not be threatened or attacked by nuclear weapons and spelled out in their Custer I statement that the UK, ’remained committed to the negative and positive security assurances we have given to the Non Nuclear Weapon States ---‘. However they went on to say that this is best achieved through the protocols to Nuclear Weapon Free Zones, effectively ruling out a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on security assurances called for by many states as a matter of priority.
In the opening statements there was a great deal of convergence on the most pressing issues of concern and the positive action needed. The link between disarmament and non-proliferation was raised by a great many states and indeed on looking at my ‘score card’ of issues referred to, the twin top issues were support for the IAEA Safeguards and Additional Protocol, and concern about new nuclear doctrines with the need to further reduce warhead numbers.
Although recognising the right of nations to the peaceful use of nuclear power, many nations spoke of the urgent need to put in place non-proliferation mechanisms to ensure that no nation was able to divert its nuclear fuel cycle to military use. Many offered support to the IAEA and stressed the need for adherence to the Additional Protocols as a pre-condition for supply and for the need to develop a nuclear fuel bank under international control.
Preventing nuclear terrorism was a key issue for many nations and the EU devoted a large part of their speech to addressing ways to ‘combat this threat’. These included support for the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the Proliferation Security Initiative, USCR 1540 and stronger controls by the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The EU is currently holding a series of thematic workshops in several regions with a view to enhancing export controls and is preparing a second EU Joint Action.
Many nations spoke on the need for universality of the treaty with most calling for India, Pakistan and Israel to accede to the treaty as NNWS and to put their nuclear material under safeguards. Some nations were particularly concerned about transference of nuclear knowledge, technology and equipment from an NPT state to a state outside the treaty.
Almost all nations called for ratification of the CTBT and its early Entry into Force. Similarly a call for the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiations on Treaty on Fissile Materials was almost universal although there are, of course, very different interpretations of what that treaty might look like.
Early on Friday there were excellent presentations on this from members of the International Panel on Fissile Material (IPFM) in a side event hosted by UNIDIR. In this session it was suggested that the Treaty itself was simple but the political and verification problems were complex. It was proposed that a Fissile Material Treaty should not only ban the production of fissile material but cover all civilian stocks of fissile material, stocks declared excess for weapons, and possibly including a commitment that no naval reactor fuel would be used for weapons use. The treaty would need to be verifiable and the IAEA should be the body to do so as they have the expertise to develop verification mechanisms. It was noted that the IAEA will need to be fully resourced and financed but it was pointed out that the cost was not prohibitive and less than current IAEA safeguards. Much of the knowledge and facilities already exist even for classified materials where information barriers will be needed. The IPFM intend to have a draft treaty available early in 2009.
In discussion arguments for and against including all stocks of fissile material were explored with questions raised about historical accuracy and the difficulty of accounting for all materials. The session covered many other issues from the view point of India, Pakistan and South Africa also and I found this session exceptionally informative and thought provoking.
Japan raised the issue of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation education many times and is taking a strong lead in implementing the UN resolution on this. They are pushing very hard for nations to address this resolution seriously. They held a joint lunch time seminar with UNIDIR with excellent speakers from Japan, US and Russia.
For a much more in depth analysis see: www.acronym.org.uk
Carol Naughton 5:05:08
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