Treaties on Nuclear Weapons

>> Background
>> New START Treaty
>> Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
>> Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
>> Fissile Material Treaty (FMCT)
>> Strategic Offensive Reduction Talks (SORT)

The 1960s saw a number of negotiations taking place with the Outer Space Treaty, banning the use of nuclear weapons in space, being signed in 1967. The same year saw the treaty making Latin America a nuclear weapon-free zone signed as well. Then, in 1968 the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was finally agreed and signed. This treaty, although designed to stop the spread of nuclear weapons also called for the nuclear weapon states (those countries that possess nuclear weapons) to begin talks that would lead to disarmament.

After years of negotiations, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was finally ready for signing in 1996. This treaty outlaws nuclear testing of any kind. It needed to be signed and ratified by the 44 countries identified as having nuclear power plants or research reactors. As of May 2003, only 31 of these had done this. Countries that we know possess nuclear weapons who have not yet ratified the treaty are China, India, Israel, Pakistan and US. However, it has been signed by 167 countries and ratified by 99. These include France who signed the treaty after completion of the series of nuclear tests in 1995-96.

The Strategic Offensive Reduction Talks (SORT) were agreed and signed by the US and Russia in 2002. Once again, much was made of this agreement in the media. The agreement was that each side would reduce their nuclear weapons to between 1700-2200 warheads by the end of 2012. This all seems very good. However, it was agreed that this figure would only be for ‘operationally deployed’ warheads. So although that would indeed mean substantial reductions, the two countries also agreed that they did not have to destroy the other warheads. The treaty expires in 2012 and each side can give three months notice of withdrawal. So, neither side actually has to do anything at all. They can keep to the current levels and withdraw from the treaty in September 2012.

On February 2nd,  2011 US President Barack Obama signed ratification documents for the  New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), an arms treaty with Russia that would reduce the nations’ nuclear arsenals and bolster verification mechanisms.

The Russian president signed similar documents at the end of January 2011, so the New Start treaty should be finally ratified in February 2011.

The treaty was approved by the US Senate in December 2010 and by the Russian parliament in January 2011.

It replaces the 1991 Start treaty which expired in December 2009.

The New START Treaty replaces the 1991 START Treaty that expired in December 2009.

Negotiations on the treaty were long and difficult at times but one year after President Obama, in his Prague speech on 9th April 2009,  re-committed the US to

“seek peace and security in a world  without nuclear weapons”,

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and U.S. President Barack Obama signed the New START treaty, a move that both sides cited as proof of their efforts to “reset” the relationship after several years of tension.

However getting the US Senate to approve ratification of the treaty was not simple with many republicans completely opposed to it. However on 22nd December 2010 the US Senate gave approval 71 – 26.  This was followed in January with approval by the Russian Duma leaving the way now clear for ratification and Entry into Force.

The treaty will bring down the numbers of strategic nuclear weapons in both countries to 1,550 warheads,  down from a current cap of 2,200,  and to 700 launchers. The treaty will also allow for a resumption of inspections of each country’s nuclear arsenal

The treaty will go into effect following an official exchange of documents, expected to take place in February 2011.

Opened for signature: 1968
Entered into Force: 1970
No of countries signed: 188
Not signed: India, Pakistan, Israel, Cook Islands, Niue

(The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), also known as North Korea, announced in January 2003 that it was withdrawing from the NPT. It later ‘suspended’ that withdrawal. There is still some confusion over the status of the DPRK).

The main objective of the NPT is to stop the spread, or ‘proliferation’, of nuclear weapons. Those countries that had tested nuclear weapons at the time had to sign as a Nuclear Weapon State (NWS). They agreed not to pass on to other countries any nuclear weapons technology and, in Article VI, it states that they also have to:

“pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament…”

Those without nuclear weapons, the Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) had to promise not to make any attempt to get them. If they stuck to this the NNWS could get help with the development of a nuclear power programme. Following the Review and Extension conference of the NPT in 1995 the treaty is reviewed every five years.

At the NPT Review Conference in 2000, the NWS agreed the following as part of a 13 step plan towards nuclear disarmament:

“An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are committed under Article VI.”

“Steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all:

* Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally.

* A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimise the risk that these weapons ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination.”

The Review Conference in 2005 was deemed a failure as agreement could not be reached on an outcome document and great hopes were placed on the 2010 Review Conference.

Review Conference of the NPT 2010

It was felt that with US President Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev stated commitment to nuclear abolition, circumstances were right for a better outcome at the 2010 Review Conference of the NPT on all three aspects of the treaty: nuclear disarmament; non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; peaceful use of nuclear energy; and, in addition, on implementation of the resolution on creating a zone free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

The Review conference took place over a month in May 2010 and indeed produced an  Outcome Document with 64 Action Points to be taken forward agreed by all states present, including the five nuclear weapons states.

On nuclear disarmament the Conference reaffirmed

“the unequivocal undertaking of the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under article VI.”

and also reaffirmed the continuing validity of the 13 Practical Steps agreed in 2010.

New was a reference to:

“the five-point proposal for nuclear disarmament of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, which proposes, inter alia, consideration of negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention or agreement on a framework of separate mutually reinforcing instruments, backed by a strong system of verification.”

Key actions agreed:

Action 5: The nuclear-weapon States commit to accelerate concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament, contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in a way that promotes international stability, peace and undiminished and increased security. To that end, they are called upon to promptly engage with a view to, inter alia:

• (a) Rapidly moving towards an overall reduction in the global stockpile of all types of nuclear weapons, as identified in action 3;
• (b) Address the question of all nuclear weapons regardless of their type or their location as an integral part of the general nuclear disarmament process;
• (c) To further diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies;
• (d) Discuss policies that could prevent the use of nuclear weapons and eventually lead to their elimination, lessen the danger of nuclear war and contribute to the non-proliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons;
• (e) Consider the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in further reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons systems in ways that promote international stability and security;
• (f) Reduce the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons; and
• (g) Further enhance transparency and increase mutual confidence.

The Conference also emphasized “the importance of a process leading to full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East” and endorsed a series of  practical steps to bring that closer.

Opened for signature: 1996
Entered into Force: Pending
No of countries signed: 182
No of countries ratified: 153

No of countries not yet signed: 13

Of the 44 countries (known as Annex 2 states) identified as having nuclear power plants or research reactors and who, therefore, must ratify the treaty before it can enter into force,  35 have done so.  Six of the Annex 2 countries have signed but not ratified: China, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, USA. Three have not signed it at all: India, Pakistan, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, also known as North Korea.

Negotiations aimed at a complete ban on nuclear testing had been going on for many years without success. As public pressure increased following the end of the Cold War, the breakthrough appeared. In 1992, the US, Russia and France agreed a temporary halt on nuclear testing. Britain had no choice but to join in as it was using the Nevada test site in the US.

Although negotiations for a CTBT began in 1994, it still wasn’t easy to achieve. China was already conducting a series of tests and in 1995 France also began a series of tests. Britain didn’t really want to lose the right to test and supported the French. It was the US and Russia who took the lead in negotiating a CTBT, despite opposition among scientists and the military.

Ways of verifying that the treaty is being followed were built into the wording. Monitoring stations similar to those used to detect earthquakes can be used to spot any large underground explosions. Gases escaping into the atmosphere can be detected and vehicle movements are tracked by satellites. Many systems are already used but there will not be complete worldwide coverage until the CTBT enters into force.

The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) was set up in 1996 with its headquarters in Vienna, Austria. It is an interim organization tasked with building up the verification regime of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in preparation for the Treaty’s entry into force as well as promoting the Treaty’s universality.

Other things can also complicate matters. The US has the technology to carry out simulated tests on computers, and it does so on a fairly regular basis in order to develop new nuclear warheads. There is also the issue of ‘sub-critical’ tests. These are tests that use chemical explosives and less than a kilo of plutonium but do not produce a nuclear explosion. A series of these have been carried out, again by the US but occasionally jointly with Britain, in underground chambers at the Nevada test site. Although this does not break the terms of the CTBT, it goes against its spirit and damages the chances of other countries signing up to the treaty.

Excerpt from Reaching Critical Will website where more information can be found. Since the entry into force of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), a significant issue for the disarmament and arms control community has been the continued production of fissile materials—the key ingredient for producing nuclear weapons. Many states have long been calling for a ban on the production of these materials. The issue has been on the UN’s agenda since 1957 and on the proposed agenda of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) for many years.

Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) or Fissile Material Treaty (FMT)?

From early on, a major obstacle to launching negotiations has been the issue of existing stocks. While some states, including the United States, United Kingdom, and Japan, favour a treaty which only limits future production of fissile materials, other states, such as those belonging to the Non-Aligned Movement, believe that the treaty should also address fissile materials already produced and stockpiled. This would require nuclear weapon states to irreversibly downblend existing stocks of weapons-grade fissile materials, ensuring they could never be used for weapons purposes again. Some states also think an FMCT should include mechanisms for the management of fissile material.

Much more information and for definition of Fissile Material see: International Panel on Fissile Materials

Opened for signature: 2002
Countries involved: United States, Russia

Much was made of this agreement in the media. The agreement was that each side would reduce their nuclear weapons to between 1700-2200 warheads by the end of 2012. This all seems very good. However, it was agreed that this figure would only be for ‘operationally deployed’ warheads. So although that would indeed mean substantial reductions, the two countries also agreed that they did not have to destroy the other warheads. The treaty expires in 2012 and each side can give three months notice of withdrawal. So, neither side actually has to do anything at all. They can keep to the current levels and withdraw from the treaty in September 2012.